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Federal Taxation
by Timothy J. Peaden*
Ben E. Muraskin*
and
James A. Lawton***
During 1995, as in past years, the Eleventh Circuit considered several
procedural issues. The procedural issues decided in 1995 involved
refund claims, tax liens, and litigation fees. As to substantive tax issues,
the court affirmed the taxpayer-favorable Tax Court decision in Estate
of Hubert v. Commissioner.1 The estate tax issue involved, however, is
a controversial one, and the Sixth and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
have previously reached a contrary conclusion.
I.
A.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Refund Claims

The Eleventh Circuit decided three "refund claim" cases during 1995.
The cases involve the sufficiency of a refund claim, amendments to a
refund claim, and set-offs to refund claims.
In United States v. Ryan,2 the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
taxpayers' written request to have an overpayment applied to a
particular year's unpaid tax liability constituted a refund claim. In a
letter attached to their 1990 federal income tax return, the Ryans
* Partner in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. Wichita State University
(B.B.A., 1980; M.S., 1981); Vanderbilt University (J.D., 1984). Executive Authorities
Editor, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law.
** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida (B.A.,
1986; J.D., 1989); New York University (LL.M., 1990). Student Editor, New York
University Tax Law Review. Clerk to the Honorable William M. Fay, United States Tax
Court (1990-92).
*** Associate in the firm of Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Michigan
(B.A., 1990; J.D., 1995).
1. 63 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995). See infra note 58.
2. 64 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir. 1995).
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directed the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to apply a 1990 overpayment to their unpaid 1989 tax liability. The IRS refused and, instead,
applied the overpayment to the Ryans' unpaid 1986 tax liability. After
filing for bankruptcy and receiving a discharge as to their earlier years'
tax liability, which included the year 1986 but not 1989, the taxpayers
brought an action in the bankruptcy court contending that the IRS
should have followed their instructions and applied the overpayment to
1989.' The bankruptcy court agreed with the Ryans.6
On appeal, the IRS contended that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction because the Ryans' action was a suit for a tax refund and the
required claim for refund had not been filed.7 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected the government's contention and found that the letter attached
to the Ryans' 1990 return constituted a claim for a refund because it
stated the source and amount of the overpayment to be credited! On
the merits of the refund claim, however, the court held that pursuant to
section 6402(a)9 the government could properly refuse to follow the
taxpayers' directions regarding the application of the overpayment to a
particular tax liability.'
The only issue presented in Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. United States"
was whether Mutual Assurance could amend the original refund claim
to increase the amount of an overpayment after the refund claim was
paid in full and after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 2 In
Mutual Assurance, the taxpayer filed a timely claim for refund for an
overpayment resulting from changes in the permitted discount factors

3. Id. at 1518.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1520. A bankruptcy court may determine the amount of any tax. 11 U.S.C.

§ 505(a)(1) (1994). However, it may not determine any right of the estate to a tax refund
before the earlier of(i) 120 days after such a request has been made or (ii) a determination
by the government with respect to such request. 11 U.S.C. § 505(aX2)(B) (1994). Similarly,
.no suit or proceeding may be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal
revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected... until a
.claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary." 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a)
(1994) (emphasis added).
8. 64 F.3d at 1521.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) (1994) specifically authorizes the IRS to credit an overpayment
against any tax liability of a taxpayer.
10. 64 F.3d at 1522-23. Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 C.B. 43, modified, Rev. Rul. 79284, 1979-2 C.B. 83 where the IRS has ruled that certain voluntary payments would be
applied as directed by the taxpayer. The Court held that these rulings did not extend to
overpayments. 64 F.3d at 1523.
11. 56 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1995).
12. Id. at 1355.
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applicable in the computation of the taxpayer's unpaid insurance loss
reserves. After the IRS paid the full amount of the claim and after the
statute of limitations for filing a refund claim had run, an audit revealed
that the correct amount of the overpayment was larger than the amount
requested in the taxpayer's refund claim. 3 The district court allowed
the taxpayer to amend its refund claim, and the government appealed."I
During oral argument, the government conceded that the timely

original claim for refund provided it with a sufficient basis for accurately
computing the correct amount of the overpayment.'" The court held
that, according to the IRS' own published ruling" and a United States
Supreme Court decision," the IRS was required to compute the correct

amount of the overpayment. 8 Thus, the IRS' payment in full of the
timely filed, original refund claim did not extinguish the claim. 9
Further, because the taxpayer's amended claim did not set forth any new
grounds for relief,20 the court allowed the original claim to be amended
and required the government to fully refund the amount set forth
therein.2 '
Whether the government can assess new penalties as a set off to a
refund claim after the statute of limitations has lapsed was answered
affirmatively in Allen v. United States.22 An increase in tax liability

(e.g., due to denial of a previously allowed deduction) determined after
the statute of limitations has run is properly set off against a refund

13. Id. at 1354.
14. Id. at 1354-55.
15. Id. at 1357 n.2.
16. Id. at 1357 (citing Rev. Rul. 81-87, 1981-1 C.B. 580 ("'[I1n order to ascertain
whether there has been an overpayment of tax, adjustments that decrease the tax must
be considered as well as adjustments that increase the tax.'")).
17. Id. at 1356 (citing Bemis Bros. Bag Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 28 (1933) ("'[Tlhe
suitor shall have the relief appropriate to the facts that he has pleaded, whether he has
prayed for it or not.'")).
18. Id. at 1356-57.
19. Id. at 1355-57. The government argued that, if full payment did extinguish the
claim, a refund claim did not exist at the time the statute of limitations expired, and there
was nothing to amend. Id. at 1355-56.
20. Id. at 1356.
21. Id. at 1355-57. The court rejected, as not binding on the Eleventh Circuit, the
United States Court of Claims holding in Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 389 F.2d 437
(1968), that "[tihe disposition of a taxpayer's refund claim by allowance of the amount
requested in full... precludes an amendment asserting an additional amount after the
expiration of the statutory period for refund." 56 F.3d at 1357.
22. 51 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 1995).
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claim,2" and the Internal Revenue Code provides that "'penalties ...
shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner as taxes...
[and that any] reference... to 'tax'imposed... shall be deemed also to
refer to ... penalties.'"24 Accordingly, the court was unpersuaded by
the taxpayer's argument that a set off attributable to penalties is
distinguishable from a set off attributable to an increase in tax liability,
and the court held in favor of the government.2"
B.

Tax Liens
Griswold v. United States26 set forth the requirements the IRS must
abide by when releasing a federal tax lien under section 6325.27 In
Griswold, the IRS assessed responsible person penalties against
Griswold which resulted in liens against his property." The IRS filed
a total of seven original or refiled notices of federal tax liens in three
counties.2" Pursuant to a settlement agreement, Griswold satisfied the
assessments.'
The IRS promptly filed certificates of release. 3'
However, one of the certificates of release could not be matched with the
corresponding tax lien or notices filed. Over a period of eighteen
months, Griswold repeatedly requested the IRS to issue a certificate of
release corresponding to this notice. 32 After exhausting administrative
remedies for the damages incurred as a result of the IRS' failure to
properly issue the certificate, Griswold filed suit against the government.3'

23. Id. at 1014 (citing Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, modified, 284 U.S. 599 (1932)
(holding that a claim for refund involves the redetermination of the entire tax liability)).
24. Id. at 1015 (citing former 26 U.S.C. § 6659(a) (1994)).
25. Id.
26. 59 F.3d 1571 (11th Cir. 1995).
27. 26 U.S.C. § 6325 (1994) directs the IRS, subject to prescribed regulations, to issue
a certificate of release of any lien imposed with respect to any internal revenue tax within
30 days after the Secretary finds that the liability assessed and interest thereon has been
satisfied or has become legally unenforceable, or a bond is presented to and accepted by the
Secretary ensuring satisfaction of the assessed liability and interest thereon. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6325.
28. 59 F.3d at 1573.
29. Id. at 1573-75. Although a tax lien arises automatically under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321
and 6322 (1994), a notice must be filed or recorded for the lien to have priority over certain
creditors of the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1994). See also In re Haas v. IRS, 31 F.3d
1081, 1084 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2578 (1995).
30. 59 F.3d at 1573.
31. Id. at 1573, 1575. Once the underlying tax obligation giving rise to a federal tax
lien has been satisfied, the IRS must release the lien within 30 days. 26 U.S.C. § 6325.
32. 59 F.3d at 1573.
33. Id at 1574. Taxpayer based its claim on 26 U.S.C. § 7432 (1994), which provides
for civil damages when the IRS, knowingly or by reason of negligence, fails to release a lien
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Prior to evaluating the sufficiency of the certificates of release in this
case, the Eleventh Circuit outlined the requirements the IRS must abide
by in releasing a federal tax lien." First, the certificate of release must
sufficiently identify the underlying tax obligation and lien.35 Second,
the certificate of release must sufficiently identify any corresponding
notices of a federal tax lien to allow a person searching title to the
property to match the documents and discover whether a lien currently
exists."8 Third, unless the lien is self-releasing, 7 the IRS must either
deliver the certificate of release to the recording office in which the
corresponding notice of federal tax lien was filed or deliver it to the
taxpayer.3 8 As to the fairly detailed facts before it, the court found that none of
the filed certificates of release adequately identified one of the liens
against Griswold's property or the corresponding notices.39 As a result,
the court held that the IRS failed to release this lien.4
In determining whether the IRS was liable for civil damages, the court
rejected the district court's holding that the law surrounding the issues
contained in this case was sufficiently uncertain that the IRS personnel
could not have acted knowingly or negligently in their failure to release
the lien.4 Instead, the court explained that "[tihe provisions requiring
the IRS to act responsibly in identifying and releasing the liens are part
of its own regulations and internal procedures."' 2 This issue was
remanded to the trial court43to determine whether such actions were
either knowing or negligent.
Litigation Fees
In Cooper v. United States," Cooper was a passive investor in a
financially-troubled business that failed to pay its federal employment
C.

under 26 U.S.C. § 6325.
34. 59 F.3d at 1575-81.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1580-81. Original notices of Federal Tax Lien filed on IRS Form 668(Y) are
self-releasing. Refiled notices of Federal Tax Lien filed on IRS Form 668-F, however, are
not self-releasing.
38. 59 F.3d at 1581.
39. Id. at 1580.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1581-82.
42. Id. at 1581.
43. Id. at 1582.
44. 60 F.3d 1529 (11th Cir. 1995).
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taxes."' Despite. evidence that Cooper had no involvement in the dayto-day operation or management of the business, the IRS assessed
penalty taxes on Cooper as a "responsible person" under section 6672.46
Cooper paid the assessment, and, after exhausting administrative
remedies, he filed a claim in district court for a refund of the penalty
and interest paid and a claim for costs and attorney fees incurred in the
collection of the refund.4 7 Three days after Cooper filed suit, the IRS
refunded the entire amount of the penalty plus interest."
As to the claim for costs and attorney fees, the district court held that
Cooper failed to prove that the IRS' position was "not substantially
justified"4 9 and denied his claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed.5" It
reasoned that the willfulness requirement of section 6672s ' demands
that a person have some knowledge of the failure or of the risk of failure
to remit the employment taxes.52 Based on evidence that Cooper lacked
such knowledge, the Court held that Cooper's action could not have been
willful as required under section 6672. 3 Finding that Cooper had
exhausted all administrative remedies, the court remanded the case to
the district court for a determination of the reasonable costs and fees to
which Cooper was entitled."
II. ESTATE TAxEs
During 1995, the Eleventh Circuit decided two estate tax cases, both
in favor of the taxpayers. One involved marital and charitable

45. Id. at 1530.
46. Id. 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1994) imposes a penalty tax on a responsible person who has
willfully failed to perform a duty to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over federal
employment taxes. The amount of the penalty tax is one hundred percent of the tax not
collected, accounted for or paid over. 26 U.S.C. § 6672.
47. 60 F.3d at 1530-31. Costs and attorney fees are available under 26 U.S.C. § 7430
(1994) to a claimant seeking a determination or refund of any tax, interest or penalty,
provided all administrative remedies have been exhausted (26 U.S.C. § 7430(b)(1)), the
claimant is a "prevailing party" (§§ 7430(a) and 7430(c)(4)(A)), and the requested award
constitutes reasonable litigation or administrative costs (§§ 7430(aX 1), 7430(a)(2), 7430(cX1)
and 7430(c)(2)).
48. 60 F.3d at 1530.
49. To qualify as a prevailing party the taxpayer must establish that the IRS' position
was not substantially justified. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(i).
50. 60 F.3d at 1532.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 6672.
52. 60 F.3d at 1532 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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deductions under sections 205555 and 2056,56 and the other involved
the deductibility of a settlement payment under section 2053."7
In Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner,"' a will contest led to a settlement agreement providing for the division of the decedent's residuary
estate.59" According to the settlement, the decedent's wife was beneficiary of a part of the residue in two trusts." A charity received the
remainder of the residue outright."' The dispositions as provided in the
settlement qualified for the marital and charitable deductions.
The executors of the estate had the power to charge any administrative expenses against income or principal or apportion the same.6 2
During the period of administration, the estate generated substantial
income and incurred substantial administration expenses." Under
applicable state law and the will of the decedent, the executors allocated
certain administrative expenses to the principal of the estate. The
executors paid the remainder of the administrative expenses out of post
death income and deducted them on the estate's income tax return.64
The government argued that the amount of the marital and charitable
deductions" must be reduced by the entire amount of administrative
6
expenses, whether those expenses are allocated to principal or income. 67
The Eleventh Circuit held, contrary to the Sixth and Federal Circuits,

55. 26 U.S.C. § 2055 (1994).
56. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1994).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 2053 (1994).
58. 63 F.3d 1083 (11th Cir. 1995).
59. Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314,315-18 (1993), affd, 63 F.3d 1083
(11th Cir. 1995).
60. 101 T.C. at 317.

61. Id.
62.
63.

63 F.3d at 1085.
Id. at 1084.

64. Id.
65. Generally, an estate is allowed a deduction for the net value of any interest which
passes from the aecedent to the surviving spouse or qualified charities. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2055
& 2056.

66. 63 F.3d at 1085. The payment of interest on estate and inheritance taxes allocated
to income does not reduce the marital deduction. Rev. Rul. 93-48, 1993-2 C.B. 580; Estate
of Richardson v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1193 (1987); Estate of Street v. Commissioner, 56
T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (1988), affd in part,revd in part,974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirmed
on this issue).
67. 974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1992). (The Sixth Circuit held that payment of administra-

tive expenses reduces the marital deduction regardless of whether such expenses are
allocated to income or principal); Burke v. United States, 994 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 546 (1993). But cf. Estate of Warren v. Commissioner, 981 F.2d 776 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding that allocation of administrative expense to income allowed by state law
did not reduce the charitable deduction).
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that the marital and charitable deductions must be reduced only by the
amount of administrative expenses paid by the estate and allocated to
the principal, where the power to allocate to income is provided in the
will and recognized by state law."8 The court reasoned that administrative expenses paid out of principal reduce the amount of principal
received by the beneficiaries and reduce the marital and charitable
deductions. 69 Administrative expenses allocable to income do not
change the amount of the estate principal received by the spouse or the
charity and do not reduce the marital and charitable deductions.70
Estate of Kosow v. Commissioner" involved an interesting set of facts
that required the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a former wife's
acceptance in a marital separation agreement of a significantly lower
support award, together with a waiver of her right to seek a modification
of the award due to changed circumstances ("foregone marital rights"),
was adequate and full consideration for the decedent's promise to leave
a portion of his estate upon his death to their children. If so, the
settlement payment made by the estate to the children after the death
of the decedent in satisfaction of the decedent's promise would be
deductible as a "claim against the estate" under section 2053(a)(3).72
Although conceding that the marital settlement agreement between
the decedent and his former wife was bona fide and resulted from arm's
length bargaining,73 the IRS argued that there was insufficient
evidence to determine as a factual matter whether the former wife gave
adequate consideration for the decedent's promise.7 4 The Tax Court
agreed, holding that the facts before it were insufficient to make a
finding of adequate and full consideration.75
68. 63 F.3d at 1084. Cf. Alston v. United States, 349 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1965) (although
permitted by Georgia law, there was no provision in the will for the payment of the
administration expenses); Ballantine v. Tomlinson, 293 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1961) (Neither
the will nor Florida law permitted the expenses there involved to be paid out of income.).
69. 63 F.3d at 1085.
70. Id.
71. 45 F.3d 1524 (11th Cir. 1995).
72. 45 F.3d at 1529-30. Deductions are allowed in the case of claims against an estate
when founded on a promise or agreement to the extent that there is a bona fide contract
for adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. 26 U.S.C. § 2053(a)(3),

(cX1)(A) (1994).
73. 45 F.3d at 1530.
74. Id. at 1531. The record did not contain any detailed evidence of the family's
standard of living, costs, net worth, annual income, and financial resources at the time of
separation. Id. at 1529. Thus, the IRS contended it was impossible to show, as was
required under applicable state law, that (i) the former wife would have been entitled to
a greater support award than that to which she agreed, and (ii) decedent had the financial
ability to pay a greater amount. Id. at 1531-32.
75. Id at 1528.

19961

FEDERAL TAXATION

887

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the Tax Coirt's decision to be
clearly erroneous.76 The court pointed out that shortly after their
divorce, the decedent's formerwife married Benjamin Sack, a man who
recently divorced. At the time of the decedent's divorce, his family and
the Sack family shared comparable standards of living and travelled in
similar circles.77 The court also noted the Sacks did not reach a
settlement agreement relating to their divorce, but the state court
awarded Mr. Sack's former wife twice the amount of support agreed
upon by decedent's former wife. 78 Based on the comparable support
award in the Sack case and other evidence,79 the court found that the
reciprocal promises in the marital settlement agreement were substantially equal in value, and therefore, the foregone marital rights
constituted adequate and full consideration for the deredent's promise.'0 Accordingly, the estate's settlement payment to the decedent's
children in satisfaction of such promise was deductible under section
2053.8'

III. EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS
The Eleventh Circuit focused on two fact scenarios luring 1995
involving the frequently litigated distinction between employee and
independent contractor classifications. In both situations the court
found independent contractor status.
In Hospital Resource Personnel,Inc. v.United States, 2 the Eleventh
Circuit found that the taxpayer, who provided specialized nurses to
hospitals in need of additional temporary staffmg, had a reasonable
basis under the statutory safe havens s for treating the nurses as

76. -d. at 1534. The court found the appropriate standard of review to be "clearly
erroneous" based on Sherman v. United States, 462 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1972). 45 F.3d
at 1528-29.
77. 45 F.3d at 1534.
78. Id.
79. Id. The taxpayer presented expert testimony regarding the likely support award
to decedent's former wife under applicable state law at the relevant time, and decedent's
former wife testified that she was unable to maintain the same standard of living on the
support award alone. In addition, the court found sufficient evidence in the record to
demonstrate that decedent was financially capable of paying a greater support award. Id.
80. Id at 1531-34.
81. Id. at 1534.
82. 68 F.3d 421 (11th Cir. 1995).
83. There are several means through which a taxpayer may prove a reasonable basis
for not treating a worker as an employee. For example, if the taxpayer did not treat an
individual as an employee for purposes of employment taxes and all federal tax returns
required to be filed by the taxpayer are filed on a basis consistent with the taxpayer's
treatment of the individual, then the individual shall be deemed not an employee unless
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independent contractors."' The court's finding was based on an
analysis of the twenty factors considered at common law, 5 the
taxpayer's reasonable reliance on Revenue Ruling 6 1 - 1 9 6 ,* and Critical
Care Register Nursing, Inc. v. United States.17 In Revenue Ruling 61196, the IRS ruled that "private duty nurses" are generally independent
contractors, not employees, except when engaged on a full-time basis
receiving a salary in the regular employ of individuals or institutions
with prescribed routines during fixed hours." In the case at hand, the
taxpayer provided undisputed evidence that its nurses did not work fixed
hours or full-time, but rather exercised full discretion in making
schedules, administering their professional services, and accepting or
declining assignments at will. 9 The nurses were paid on an hourly
basis and could hold themselves out to the public for direct employment
with hospitals, other agencies, or private parties.'
Critical Care
involved facts that were practically indistinguishable from the facts in
HospitalResource Personnel. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded in Critical Care that the
taxpayer had established a reasonable basis for not treating its workers
as employees under traditional common law rules."' Accordingly, the
taxpayer in Hospital Resource Personnel was not required to withhold
and pay employment taxes for the specialized nurses.92
In Butts v. Commissioner," the Eleventh Circuit affirmed two Tax
Court determinations, 4 which involved identical facts. The court held

the taxpayer had no reasonable basis for not treating such individual as an employee. A
taxpayer will have a reasonable basis for not treating a worker as an employee if such
treatment was in reasonable reliance of any of the following: (i) judicial precedent,

published rulings, technical advice with respect to the taxpayer, or a letter ruling to the
taxpayer; or (ii) long-standing recognized practice of a significant segment of the industry
in which such individual was engaged. Sections 530(aX1) and (a)(2XA), (C) of the Revenue
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86 (1981).
84. 68 F.3d at 428.
85. Id. at 427 (listing the factors provided in Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, for
determining an employer-employee relationship). Note that the taxpayer failed to prove

that it was exempt from employment taxes under Section 530(a)(2)(C) of the Revenue Act
of 1978, 92 Stat. at 2885-86.
86. 1961-2 C.B. 155.
87. 776 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1991).

88.
89.
90.
91.

1961-2 C.B. 155.
68 F.3d at 426.
Id.
Id. See 776 F. Supp. at 1025.

92.

68 F.3d at 426.

93. 49 F.3d 713 (lth Cir. 1995).
94. Smithwick v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1545 (1993), affd, 49 F.3d 713 (11th
Cir. 1995); Butts v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1041 (1993), affd, 49 F.3d 713 (11th
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that insurance salespersons of Allstate InsuranceI Company were
independent contractors, not employees; thus, they could report their
claimed business deductions on Schedule C of their income tax returns,
rather than on Schedule A as unreimbursed business expenses."5
IV.

ACTIVITIES NOT ENGAGED IN FOR PROFIT

Osteen v. Commissioners involved the activity of breeding and
raising Percheron horses in Florida. Percherons are a breed of large
draft horses originally bred for moving or towing heavy objects before the
advent of tractors." There were no Percheron horse breeders nor was
there a market for Percherons in Florida at the time.9 For several
consecutive years, the taxpayers generated losses from the horse
breeding activity." The government disallowed the losses on the
grounds that the breeding activity was not engaged in for profit, and it
imposed substantial understatement penalties."°
The court agreed with the government and the Tax Court's decision
that the taxpayers' breeding activity was not engaged in for profit. It
focused on (i) the taxpayers' lack of experience in horse breeding, (ii) the
absence of an established market for the horses, (iii) the failure to hire
or associate with experienced persons, (iv) the limited time spent
managing the operation, (v) the lack of any profitability assessment of
breeding Percherons in Florida, (vi) the significant income of the
taxpayers-a full-time bank executive and a full-time registered
nurse-which allowed them to tolerate the losses, and (vii) the string of
consistent losses.'0 1
Accordingly, the disallowed losses were not
deductible."12

As for the substantial understatement penalties, the court found
substantial authority for the taxpayers' position.'
Some evidence in

Cir. 1995).
95. 49 F.3d at 714.
96. 62 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1995).
97. Id.at 358.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 357.
101. Id. at 358. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (stating nine factors to be considered in
determining a profit motive).

102. 62 F.3d at 360.
103. Id. The court criticized the Tax Court for giving little explanation as to why there
is substantial authority in one case, but not in another. Further, it found the application
of the substantial authority test confusing in this case where the issue before the court
involved the application of the facts to clear legal ztandards. It called for the Tax Court

to set forth a "consistent and workable" test in these and similar cases. Id. at 359-60.
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the record supported a profit motive, and the court referenced cases
involving similar facts where the Tax Court rendered the opposite
conclusion.'"
V.

CONCLUSiON

As in prior years, procedural cases were an important part of the cases
decided by the Eleventh Circuit. The most significant substantive case
was the taxpayer favorable decision in Estate of Hubert.

104. Id.

